Friday, February 29, 2008

ISRAEL

Congress Watch
A Conservative Total for U.S. Aid to Israel: $91 Billion—and Counting
By Shirl McArthur
With the turmoil surrounding the presidential election essentially freezing Congress into inaction, this is probably a good time to take another look at aid to Israel. The common figure given for U.S. aid to Israel is $3 billion per year—$1.2 billion in economic aid and $1.8 billion in military aid. As impressive as this figure is, however, since it represents about one-sixth of total U.S. foreign aid, the true figure is even more remarkable. It is difficult, however, to arrive at an exact number. Much of the money the U.S. gives Israel is buried in the budgets of other government agencies, primarily the Defense Department (DOD). Other subsidies come in a form that isn’t easily quantifiable, such as the early disbursement of aid, which allows Israel to gain (and the U.S. taxpayer to lose) the interest on the unspent money.
This year’s appropriations bills for FY 2001, which began Oct. 1, 2000, include, in addition to the $2.82 billion in economic and military foreign aid to Israel, an additional $60 million in so-called refugee resettlement and $250 million in the DOD budget, plus $85 million imputed interest, for a total of at least $3.215 billion. In addition, on Nov. 14, 2000, President William Clinton sent a special request to Congress for an additional $450 million in military aid to Israel in FY 2001, plus $350 million for FY 2002.
The package also included $225 million in military aid for Egypt and $75 million in security assistance for Jordan. The $450 million for Israel is not included in these calculations, because it is unclear at this writing whether Congress will approve the package in the current political climate.
Calculating Total U.S. Aid
Unquestionably, Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. aid since World War II. Estimates for total U.S. aid to Israel vary, however, because of the uncertainties and ambiguities described above. An Oct. 27, 2000 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, using available and verifiable numbers, gives cumulative aid to Israel from 1949 through FY 2000 (which ended Sept. 30, 2000) at $81.38 billion. On the other hand, last year the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs estimated total aid to Israel through FY 2000 at $91.82 billion.
The CRS number surely is too low, because, although it does include such things as the old food-for-peace program, the $1.2 billion from the Wye agreement, and the current subsidy for “refugee resettlement,” it does not include money from the DOD budget, on the grounds that those funds are for joint research and development projects. Nor does the CRS figure include estimated interest on the early disbursement of aid funds. Last year’s Washington Report estimate imputes an amount for “other aid” (including the DOD) that may no longer be valid, based as it is on a thorough study of three representative years. While this year’s estimate is more conservative, the results are still shockingly high.
To the CRS number of $81.38 billion through FY 2000 can be added (with details to follow):
• $4.28 billion from the DOD; and
• $1.72 billion in interest from early disbursement of aid, for a total of $87.38 billion through Sept. 30, 2000. To that can be added the $3.22 billion detailed above, giving a grand total of $90.6 billion total aid to Israel through FY 2001. Approval of Clinton’s special request for $450 million more in military aid would push the number over $91 billion.
Defense Department Funds
A search going back several years was able to identify $3.423 billion in specific DOD line items appropriated to Israel. Since that figure includes only the programs that were uncovered, it is reasonable to add 25 percent, or $856 million, to account for what was not found. The largest items in the DOD budget were $1.3 billion for the cancelled Lavi attack fighter project; $628 million for the ongoing Arrow anti-missile missile project; and $200 million for the completed Merkava tank. The fact that the U.S. military was not interested in the Lavi or the Merkava for its own use and has said the same thing about the Arrow would seem to invalidate the argument that these are “joint defense projects.”
Interest
Israel began receiving early disbursement of U.S. economic aid in 1982, and of military aid in 1991. It would be inaccurate to simply apply the rate of interest to the amount of aid, because it has to be assumed that the aid monies were drawn down over the course of the year. In 1991 it was reported that Israel earned $86 million in interest on the economic aid money deposited in the U.S. Treasury. Since the period from 1982 to 1991 was a time of relatively high interest rates, the figure of $860 million (86 x 10) seems a reasonably conservative estimate for those 10 years. For the nine years since 1991, a 6 percent rate was applied to one-half of the economic aid, for a total of $324 million over the past decade.
On the military aid, the 6 percent rate was applied to one-half of the military aid for the 10 years it has been disbursed early, for a total of $540 million.
Some Comparisons
The impressive numbers for U.S. aid to Israel become even more so when they, and the attached conditions, are compared with other Middle East countries. The roughly $3.3 billion in annual aid compares with some $2 billion for Egypt, $225 million for Jordan, and $35 million for Lebanon. Aid for the Palestinian Authority (PA) is not earmarked, but has been running at about $100 million. Furthermore, aid to the PA is strictly controlled by the U.S. Agency for International Development, and goes for specific projects, mostly civil infrastructure projects such as water and sewers.
On the other hand, the U.S. gives Israel all of its economic aid directly in cash, with no accounting of how the funds are used. The military aid from the DOD budget is mostly for specific projects. Significantly however, considering current events, one of those projects was the development of the Merkava tank, which has been encircling and firing on Palestinian towns in the West Bank and Gaza.
The only condition the congressional foreign aid bill places on military aid to Israel is that about 75 percent of it has to be spent in the U.S. In contrast with other countries receiving military aid, however, who purchase through the DOD, Israel deals directly with U.S. companies, with no DOD review.
Special mention should also be made of the details of the Wye agreement. All of the $400 million going to the PA under the agreement is economic aid, whereas all of the $1.2 billion for Israel is for military projects and programs. These include $40 million for armored personnel carriers and $360 million for Apache helicopters, again significant considering current events.
Loans, The “Cranston Amendment,” and Loan Guarantees
Currently, Israel owes the U.S. government almost $3 billion in economic and military loans. Direct government-to-government loans are included in the above numbers for total aid, because repayment of several loans has been “waived” by the U.S. Israeli officials are fond of saying that Israel has never defaulted on a loan from the U.S. Technically, this is true. The CRS report, however, notes that from FY 1994 through FY 1998 $29 billion in U.S. loans have been waived for Israel. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider all loans to Israel the same as grants.
There seems to be much confusion about the so-called “Cranston Amendment,” named after the California senator who sponsored it in 1984. The amendment said, simply, that it is “the policy and intention” of the U.S. to give Israel economic aid “not less than” the amount Israel owes the U.S. in annual debt interest and principal payments.
Since official economic aid to Israel has always been considerably higher than the annual debt repayments, this is something of a non-issue. Furthermore, since the amendment is simply a statement of policy and intent, it may not be legally binding. In any event, although the amendment was included in every aid appropriations bill through FY 1998, it has not been repeated in the FY 1999, 2000, and 2001 appropriations bills.
The amount of U.S. government loan guarantees to Israel was not included in the above numbers, because they have not cost the U.S. any money (yet), although they are listed as “contingent liabilities” (that is, they would become liabilities to the U.S. should Israel default). Nevertheless, they unquestionably have been of tangible financial benefit to Israel. The major loan guarantees issued by Washington have been $600 million for housing between 1972 and 1990; the much publicized $10 billion for Soviet Jewish resettlement between 1992 and 1997; and some $5 billion for refinancing military loans commercially. Currently, the total U.S. contingent liability for Israeli loans is about $10 billion.
The Neeman Agreement
After Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu told Congress in 1996 that he wanted to reduce the level of U.S. economic aid to Israel, Israeli Finance Minister Yaacov Neeman met with members of Congress in January 1998 to negotiate the details. After much backing and forthing, they reached agreement that Israel’s then-$1.2 billion in economic aid would be decreased annually, beginning FY 1999, by $120 million, and the $1.8 billion in military aid would be increased by half that, or $60 million.
As a little-reported part of the deal, the amount of military aid that Israel was allowed to spend in Israel would be increased by $15 million per year. From FY 1988 through 1990 Israel was allowed to use $400 million of its $1.8 billion U.S. military aid in Israel. Beginning in FY 1991 that was increased to $475 million. As a result of the Neeman agreement, beginning in FY 1999 the aid appropriations bill gave the amount to be spent in Israel as a percentage of the total, rather than a stated amount. This maneuver helped hide from U.S. defense contractors the fact that the U.S. direct subsidy to their Israeli competitors was being increased by $15 million per year. For FY 2001 the stated percentage works out to $520 million. None of this is included in the above figures, because it does not represent a direct cost to the U.S. taxpayers. It is clearly an indirect cost, however, in terms of lost tax revenue and lost business for American companies. X
Shirl McArthur, a retired foreign service officer, is a consultant in the Washington, DC area.
SIDEBAR #1
Arab Americans Lose Ground in Congress
While Arab-American candidates broke even in the 2000 elections for the House of Representatives, a major loss was suffered in the Senate, where the only Arab-American senator, Michigan Republican Spencer Abraham, was narrowly and unexpectedly defeated by former Rep. Debbie Stabenow (D-MI). Stabenow had a neutral score in this magazine’s Congressional Report Card (August/September issue), with one positive and one negative mark, although she did sign the letter to President Clinton urging the delinking of the economic sanctions against Iraq from the military sanctions.
In the House, Arab-American Reps. John Baldacci (D-ME), Chris John (D-LA), Ray LaHood (R-IL), Nick Rahall (D-WV), and John Sununu (R-NH) all were re-elected. In addition, Republican newcomer Darrell Issa was easily elected in California. Issa’s victory offset the narrow defeat of Democrat Steve Danner in Missouri for the seat previously held by retiring Rep. Pat Danner (D-MO).
Other re-elected representatives sympathetic to issues important to Arab Americans include Reps. David Bonior (D-MI), John Conyers (D-MI), Tom Davis (R-VA), John Dingell (D-MI), Dennis Kucinich (D-OH), Bob Ney (R-OH), and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA). Unfortunately, a champion of Arab-American issues was lost when Rep. Tom Campbell (R-CA) failed in his bid to unseat Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA).
Other congressional election news included the surprise defeat of Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D-CT), who was the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee. Although he was widely considered a good friend of Israel, Gejdenson’s report card was only slightly negative, with no positive and one negative mark. He is expected to be replaced as ranking Democrat on the committee by Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA), also considered a strong friend of Israel. A Holocaust survivor, Lantos might be expected to be sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians living under the heel of a brutal occupying power, but his report card showed one positive and two negative marks. Lantos also signed the letter to Clinton urging the president to “stand firm” in keeping the economic sanctions on Iraq.

Thursday, February 28, 2008

"USTED ES EL LIDER"

POLÍTICA
Viernes 26 de marzo de 2004
La Tercera >
Política
"Usted es el líder", le dijo Pinochet a Kissinger en 1976
Esa es parte del diálogo que habría sostenido el entonces gobernante de facto con el secretario de Estado norteamericano, según la investigación del periodista estadounidense John Dinges en su libro "The Condor years".
Fecha edición: 26-03-2004
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El secretario de Estado norteamericano en 1976, Henry Kissinger, era considerado el "líder" de la ofensiva de los gobiernos militares en América del Sur, según dijo en ese entonces Augusto Pinochet.
Así se desprende de la nueva investigación que el periodista estadounidense John Dinges presentó sobre las dictaduras sudamericanas en los 70 y la Operación Cóndor, el plan de coordinación entre los servicios secretos y represivos de esos gobiernos autoritarios.Según relata Dinges en el libro "The Condor years", que se presentó esta semana en Washington, Kissinger le dijo a Pinochet -durante una reunión que mantuvieron en junio de 1976 en Santiago- que "en Estados Unidos simpatizamos con lo que usted está tratando de hacer aquí"."Mi evaluación es que usted es la víctima de los grupos de izquierda alrededor de todo el mundo, y que su mayor pecado fue que usted derribó un gobierno que se estaba haciendo comunista", le dijo Kissinger a Pinochet según el relato reconstruido por el reportero."Nosotros estamos detrás de usted, usted es el líder", fue la respuesta del general.

PAPEL DE EEUUNumerosas investigaciones, reforzadas por la divulgación de documentos secretos ordenada por el gobierno de Bill Clinton, pusieron en evidencia la participación de ciertos sectores de la diplomacia estadounidense en el ambiente previo al golpe de Estado de 1973. Otros documentos recientemente difundidos mostraron también al menos un conocimiento de parte de autoridades estadounidenses de la puesta en marcha de la Operación Cóndor entre las fuerzas represivas de Argentina, Brasil, Uruguay, Paraguay y Chile.Dinges dice en su libro que, en la época, la diplomacia estadounidense mantuvo "caminos separados", por un lado alegando la defensa de los derechos humanos y por el otro, con la complacencia de Kissinger, alentando a las dictaduras en América del Sur.

PINOCHET Y SUS ALIADOS

Operacion Condor: El Plan que se volvio contra Pinochet y sus aliados
Una reveladora e inédita investigación de la más importanteoperación terrorista de las dictaduras militares de los ’80.
Por John DingesTraducción: Francisca Skoknic
La Operación Cóndor fue un exitoso plan de asesinatos que ahora está volviendo, un cuarto de siglo después, para perseguir en la vejez a sus inventores. Los crímenes que se cometieron en Europa, Estados Unidos y países latinoamericanos para capturar y eliminar a los enemigos de los dictadores militares del Cono Sur, se han transformado en catalizadores de los procesos judiciales que reflejan la arena tricontinental en que tuvo lugar la actividad del Cóndor.
La semana pasada en Chile, la evidencia de las operaciones de Cóndor fue la que estuvo en el centro de la decisión de la Corte de Apelaciones de revocar la inmunidad del general (r) Augusto Pinochet. La resolución reabrió la posibilidad de que Pinochet tenga que enfrentar un proceso por violaciones a los derechos humanos; pero lo más significativo es que pone a Chile en línea con los tribunales de al menos otros cuatro países que están desarrollando procesos en torno las actividades internacionales de la Operación Cóndor.
Cóndor era el “grandioso plan” de Pinochet -como fue descrito por uno de los oficiales de inteligencia invitados a unirse a él- para vencer al comunismo mundial. ¿Cómo llegó la más ambiciosa -algunos dirían las más exitosa- apuesta geopolítica del ex dictador a los implacables procesos que están copando su vejez?
Los rasgos generales de la Operación Cóndor se conocen desde hace años, pero sólo recientemente hay copiosa documentación nueva y entrevistas con participantes que me hacen posible llevar a cabo una investigación rigurosa de sus operaciones clandestinas. El resultado completo está en mi libro Los Años Cóndor. Algunas de las nuevas revelaciones relevantes para el proceso judicial son entregadas aquí.
En octubre de 1998, cuando el juez Baltasar Garzón pidió la extradición del general Pinochet desde Londres para enfrentar un juicio en España, eligió los crímenes del Cóndor para fundamentar la petición: la captura del líder del MIR, Edgardo Enríquez, en Argentina en abril de 1976 y su consecuente traslado secreto hacia Chile. A las pocas semanas, cortes de Roma y París abrieron investigaciones judiciales centradas en otros casos del Cóndor que involucraban la captura de uruguayos y chilenos en Argentina. A medida que en años recientes esos juicios avanzaron, un proceso Cóndor aun más elaborado fue iniciado en Argentina. El juez investigador Rodofo Canicoba eligió los casos de 72 víctimas -chilenos, argentinos, bolivianos, paraguayos y uruguayos- que fueron capturados por fuerzas de seguridad fuera de sus propios países.
Su proceso nombra como acusados a una larga lista de altas personalidades militares, incluyendo a Pinochet, al dictador argentino Jorge Rafael Videla, el paraguayo Alfredo Stroessner y el boliviano Hugo Banzer (estos dos últimos ya fallecidos). Las solicitudes de extradición para todos estos casos hacen que estos líderes y más de 200 otros oficiales militares nombrados como acusados o testigos materiales, sean incapaces de viajar fuera de sus países por temor a ser arrestados por Interpol. Otra ironía, ya que la Operación Cóndor fue explícitamente diseñada para imitar (con métodos ilegales) la cooperación internacional de las fuerzas policiales que caracteriza a Interpol.
Finalmente, el 2002 el juez Juan Guzmán inició su investigación “2182-98 Operación Cóndor”, que condujo al reciente desafuero de Pinochet. Ese caso también se centra en la captura y asesinato de Edgardo Enríquez y en una serie de detenciones de Cóndor en Argentina y Chile, quizá la operación más compleja y que llevó a la desaparición de 16 personas y la extorsión de otros por decenas de miles de dólares.
Una cosa es innegable sobre la Operación Cóndor: en términos de su objetivo declarado -eliminar a los enemigos del gobierno militar- fue un éxito. Entre las más famosas de sus operaciones estuvieron el asesinato del general Carlos Prats y su esposa, y el atentado al ex Vicepresidente Bernardo Leighton en Roma. Así, Cóndor, como una alianza formal de seis países, fue establecida en 1975 bajo la inspiración de Chile como un nuevo modelo organizacional para la persecución internacional de enemigos.
Menos conocidas son las exitosas operaciones de Cóndor contra la clandestina Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR), encabezada por el jefe del MIR Edgardo Enríquez desde Argentina, y aquella contra la red financiera del Partido Comunista chileno. Estas dos operaciones, que están en el centro de la investigación del juez Guzmán, forman parte también de las investigaciones española, francesa y argentina.
Edgardo Enríquez, hermano del fundador del MIR, Miguel Enríquez, y su sucesor como cabeza del movimiento, había establecido secretamente su base de operaciones en Buenos Aires en mayo de 1975. El arresto en Paraguay, el mismo mes, del operador del MIR Jorge Fuentes y de un camarada argentino, fue el comienzo de la cooperación formal de las fuerzas de seguridad de Chile, Paraguay y Argentina. Los arrestos paraguayos entregaron información conducente a una serie de operaciones en Argentina, en las cuales los líderes más importantes del MIR fueron eliminados uno a uno, culminando con la captura de Enríquez en abril de 1976, cuando dejaba una casa de seguridad en Buenos Aires.
De acuerdo a mi investigación y a las evidencias en manos del juez Guzmán, la Operación Cóndor fue creciendo como alianza militar a partir de estos esfuerzos coordinados para derribar a los hombres operativos del MIR y sus aliados en otras organizaciones revolucionarias.
Cóndor fue formalmente establecido en un encuentro de oficiales de inteligencia en Santiago hacia fines de noviembre de 1975 y fue una creación de Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay y más tarde, de alguna manera, Brasil.
Uno de los oficiales militares interrogados por el juez Guzmán reconoció, en una declaración obtenida por el autor, que entregó las invitaciones personalmente a los jefes en todos estos países y sugirió --en una evidencia revelada aquí por primera vez- que el general Pinochet podría haber tenido un rol directo en la reunión de Cóndor. El oficial, coronel de Aviación Mario Jahn Barrera, entonces director de operaciones internacionales de la DINA, dijo haber asistido a la sesión inaugural del encuentro de cinco días. “Es posible que (la reunión de inteligencia) haya sido presidida por el general Pinochet o por alguno de los miembros de la Junta, dada la importancia que se quería otorgar a esta conferencia”, dijo en su declaración al juez Guzmán.
La detención de Enríquez era el golpe final para el ya tambaleante MIR y la alianza de la JCR. Fue seguido por otros importantes golpes de Cóndor a los enemigos de los gobiernos militares. En los meses de mayo a octubre de 1976 las coordinadas operaciones de seguridad se intensificaron, y se expandieron para incluir oficiales uruguayos y bolivianos. Los “éxitos” son impresionantes. La lista de líderes internacionales capturados y asesinados incluye al segundo de Enríquez en el mando, Patricio Biedma; dos jóvenes oficiales de seguridad de la embajada cubana en Argentina; el ex Presidente de Bolivia, general Juan José Torres; el máximo líder del ERP Mario Roberto Santucho; y un alto líder de los Tupamaros uruguayos, William Whitelaw. Todos estaban vinculados directa o indirectamente con la Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria.
LA JCR había establecido sus bases en Argentina poco tiempo después del Golpe en Chile en septiembre de 1973. Bien financiada con millones de dólares provenientes de secuestros en Argentina, tenía fábricas de armamento y redes de militantes en preparación para una planeada ofensiva multinacional contra las dictaduras. Acorralada en 1976, la JCR dejó de operar en Argentina y no volvió a ser una amenaza para los gobiernos militares.
Los prisioneros de la JCR -bolivianos, paraguayos, chilenos, uruguayos y cubanos- fueron recluidos en un edificio conocido como Automotores Orletti, que antes sirvió como taller mecánico, en el barrio Floresta de Buenos Aires. Orletti era un centro de detención secreta destinado a las actividades de Cóndor. Ahí los prisioneros internacionales eran torturados e interrogados por oficiales de sus propios países. Después eran llevados en camiones y ejecutados. Algunos de los cuerpos (incluyendo los de los dos cubanos) fueron encontrados en el puerto en tambores parcialmente llenados con cemento. Docenas de uruguayos de otro grupo revolucionario, Partido Para la Victoria, fueron interrogados en Orletti.
Las operaciones de Cóndor definieron como blancos a enemigos políticos no violentos, a los que persiguieron tan intensamente como a los militantes de la JCR y otros revolucionarios. En el mismo período, una operación conjunta argentino-uruguaya secuestró a dos prominentes líderes políticos uruguayos, Zelmar Michelini y Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz, y abandonaron bajo un puente sus cuerpos acribillados dentro de un auto. Y en Washington, un grupo anticastrista de terroristas cubanos, encabezados por el oficial chileno de la DINA Michael Townley, puso una bomba en el auto del ex canciller chileno Orlando Letelier, asesinándolo en la principal avenida de la capital estadounidense.
En noviembre de 1976, un comando operativo de 15 chilenos, argentinos y uruguayos fue enviado a Europa a otra compleja misión de Cóndor: matar al líder de de la JCR René “Gato” Valenzuela en París. De acuerdo a documentos de la CIA obtenidos por el autor, la misión también tenía como objetivo el asesinato del famoso líder terrorista Carlos, “el Chacal” (Ilich Ramírez Sánchez), blanco de Cóndor desde que su nombre fue descubierto en una libreta de direcciones de un militante de la JCR, en mayo de 1975.
La operación europea fue descubierta por la CIA y el servicio de inteligencia francés y la filtración arruinó la misión. La inteligencia francesa confrontó a los servicios secretos chileno, uruguayo y argentino envueltos en la operación, diciéndoles que sabía acerca del plan, lo que implicó la cancelación de la misión, de acuerdo con documentos estadounidenses desclasificados.
Esa fue otra trágica ironía: la CIA descubrió a Cóndor y sus planes de asesinar a los líderes opositores más de dos meses antes del asesinato de Letelier, pero falló en enviar un mensaje de alerta. El asesinato de Letelier en Washington, que según han probado tanto las cortes de Estados Unidos como la chilena fue ejecutada por la DINA, es el único caso de un acto terrorista cometido dentro de Estados Unidos por un gobierno aliado, Chile, en ese tiempo uno de sus amigos más cercanos en América Latina.
Otra operación menos famosa investigada en el proceso que lleva el juez Guzmán es quizás la misión más elaborada y compleja de todas las de Cóndor, involucrando el acorralamiento y desaparición de 16 personas en dos países, la extorsión y confiscación de decenas de miles de dólares, y un elaborado esquema de encubrimiento. Un comunista chileno con pasaporte suizo, Alexei Jaccard Siegler, transportaba un maletín con dinero en efectivo desde Europa para entregar a sus contactos del partido en Santiago. Aterrizó en Buenos Aires el 16 de mayo de 1977 y fue capturado en la calle al día siguiente. Los agentes argentinos inmediatamente rodearon a 12 comunistas argentinos y otros dos chilenos ligados a Jaccard. En ese tiempo ni el Partido Comunista chileno ni el argentino estaban siguiendo una estrategia de resistencia armada contra los gobiernos de sus países.
En Santiago, agentes de la DINA secuestraron a dos operadores del Partido Comunista de quienes se sospechaba serían los receptores del dinero que llevaba Jaccard. Pocos días después, otros dos chilenos, el acaudalado operador de cambio Jacobo Stulman y su esposa Matilde, fueron dejados en custodia apenas llegaron desde Santiago al aeropuerto de Ezeiza en Buenos Aires. Los siete chilenos y nueve argentinos están en las listas de desaparecidos.
El gobierno suizo y organizaciones judías estadounidenses hicieron agresivos esfuerzos por investigar las desapariciones. Para cubrir sus huellas, los agentes de inteligencia falsificaron la partida de Jaccard y los Stulman desde Argentina, usando falsos registros de hotel y documentos de inmigración. Los documentos falsos mostraban a Jaccard viajando a Chile pocos días después de su arresto, y luego partiendo de Santiago a Uruguay. También pretendían mostrar al matrimonio Stulman llegando a Montevideo. En un vano esfuerzo por rescatar a la pareja, su familia pagó decenas de miles de dólares en rescate a personas desconocidas.
En este caso, nuevamente hay una ironía. Los familiares de los Stulman pagaron al actual abogado de Pinochet, Ambrosio Rodríguez, para viajar a Argentina y averiguar qué había pasado con la pareja. Rodríguez, entonces como hoy, tiene un asombroso acceso a los círculos íntimos de los dictadores en ambos países. En Santiago, se reunió con el coronel Manuel Contreras, jefe de la DINA. Recibió información sobre los Stulman de parte del Primer Cuerpo del Ejército, la unidad que controlaba la capital argentina, cuyo Batallón de Inteligencia 601 era la contraparte operacional de Chile en la Operación Cóndor.Luego se reunió con Enrique Arancibia Clavel, a quien identifico en Los Años Cóndor como el agente de inteligencia más clandestino de la DINA en Buenos Aires, y el vínculo de la DINA con su contraparte, el Batallón 601. En un notable reporte de Arancibia a sus superiores en la DINA, fechado el 17 de julio de 1977, Arancibia escribe: “Con fecha 8/7/77 se contactó conmigo Ambrosio Rodríquez, quien me planteó que su permanencia en Buenos Aires peligraba debido a que estaba haciendo averiguaciones sobre un matrimonio de origen judío Stulman. Aparentemente Rodríguez tomó contacto con altos jefes del Ejército argentino en el área Seguridad, los que le indicaron en forma indirecta que este matrimonio “ya no existía”… El informe oficial de 1er Cuerpo del Ejército argentino es que fueron entregados (los Stulman) a funcionarios DINA”.
A pesar de que Rodríguez fue extremadamente bien pagado por la familia, el destino de los Stulman y su dinero nunca se supo. Rodríguez está en posición de ser un testigo material, con un potencial testimonio clave sobre el secuestro de los Stulman, y al mismo tiempo como abogado defensor del inculpado en el caso, Pinochet. De acuerdo a las fuentes, no ha cooperado en la investigación del juez Guzmán.
Este ejemplo de una operación exitosa de Cóndor contra la red financiera que sostenía al PC en Chile demuestra en detalle las gruesas evidencias dejadas por las actividades internacionales de Cóndor. La abundante evidencia es una de las razones para que las investigaciones de Cóndor hayan sido tan importantes en los esfuerzos -a nivel internacional y nacional- para llevar a los dictadores hasta la justicia.
La evidencia para este caso -y para muchas otras operaciones de Cóndor-, está disponible en documentos descubiertos o desclasificados en Estados Unidos, Paraguay, Argentina y otros países. Cuando Chile recuperó la democracia en 1990, los oficiales de Pinochet fueron extraordinariamente meticulosos en destruir indiscriminadamente documentos en Chile (sólo unos pocos documentos que mencionaban a Cóndor sobrevivieron a la limpieza en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores). Pero en los países aliados la historia fue otra.
Docenas de documentos que describían las características de Cóndor y de télex que probaban la coordinación internacional para destruir a sus enemigos fueron encontrados en Paraguay y guardados en el llamado “Archivo del Terror” bajo el auspicio de la Corte Suprema. Los militares argentinos depuraron la mayoría de los archivos operacionales que podrían haber probado su responsabilidad en crímenes masivos, pero fueron descuidados en la limpieza de lo que aludía a Chile. Una corte argentina guarda varios miles de páginas de comunicaciones secretas entre el hombre de Cóndor en Buenos Aires, Enrique Arancibia Clavel, y sus jefes de la DINA en Santiago.
Esos documentos (descubiertos en la Corte Federal Argentina por Mónica González) entregan un mapa de ruta del desarrollo de Cóndor en muchas de sus operaciones más importantes, especialmente cuando se examinan junto a otras fuentes.
Cóndor también atrajo la atención especial de la CIA y el FBI. Sus informes, ahora desclasificados, quedaron a salvo de los esfuerzos de Pinochet y sus aliados de esconder la evidencia de sus operaciones internacionales. El conjunto de las evidencias de Cóndor es monumental e innegable.
La evidencia de la participación directa de Pinochet es también sólida en el caso de Cóndor. Primero, el establecimiento una alianza militar internacional involucrando a seis países de América Latina sólo pudo permitirse con la aprobación explícita del jefe de Estado, Pinochet. Operaciones de más bajo nivel pueden quizás explicarse como “abusos aislados” o, como dice Pinochet en su entrevista a un canal de televisión de Miami, porque “en la lucha política hay gente que no se controla”. Pero no una alianza internacional aprobada en una reunión de alto nivel en Santiago, financiada por Chile y -de acuerdo con el coronel Jahn- quizás con la presencia personal de Pinochet.
Hay otra evidencia descubierta en mi investigación que apunta al involucramiento de Pinochet en la creación de Cóndor. De acuerdo con un documento fechado el 15 de septiembre de 1975, que llegó hasta las manos del dirigente chileno Hugo Miranda en 1977, Contreras supuestamente informó a Pinochet de sus planes de expandir la DINA en operaciones internacionales y pidió fondos: US$ 600.000, una suma enorme en ese tiempo. A pesar de que la autenticidad y origen de ese documento nunca ha sido confirmada, recibí un reporte de una fuerte confidencial describiendo una reunión en la misma época en el Diego Portales que corrobora la solicitud de fondos y la participación de Pinochet: de acuerdo a esta fuente, que estuvo presente, el coronel Mario Jahn se reunió con Pinochet para conseguir fondos para la “internacionalización” de la DINA.
Jahn era el hombre que Contreras puso a cargo del proyecto, según la fuente: “Era el hombre de Contreras para la internacionalización. Tuvo una reunión (con Pinochet) en uno de los comedores presidenciales. Y le dijo: ‘este es el momento de moverse, de avanzar y llevar la lucha a nivel mundial’. Pidió dinero. Dijo que los americanos estaban ayudando a través de Brasil”.
John Dinges, fue corresponsal en Chile en los años 70. Junto a Saul Landau escribió Asesinato en Washington, sobre el atentado a Orlando Letelier. El material de investigación para este artículo es en su gran mayoría parte de su libro Los años Cóndor: Cómo Pinochet y sus aliados llevaron el terrorismo a tres continentes (The New Press 2004), que será publicado en español en diciembre por Ediciones B.
Condor: The Plan that Backfired Pinochet and his Allies
By John Dinges© 2004Operation Condor was a murderously successful plan that is returning a quarter century later to plague the old age of its inventors. It resulted in operations in Europe, the United States and in Latin American countries to capture and eliminate the enemies of the military dictators. Now, the crimes of Condor have become the catalyst for judicial prosecutions that mirror the three continent arena of Condor activity.
Last week, the evidence of Condor operations was at the center of the decision by the appeals court revoke the immunity of General Augusto Pinochet. The ruling reopens the possibility that Pinochet may have to face trial for human rights crimes, but most significantly the decision by the Santiago court places Chile in line with courts in at least four other countries that have built international prosecutions around the international activities of Operation Condor.
Condor was Pinochet's "grandiose scheme"--as it was described by one of the intelligence officers invited to join it-- to defeat world communism. How did Pinochet's most ambitious --some would say his most successful--geopolitical venture lead to the relentless prosecutions that are plaguing his old age?
The general outlines of Operation Condor have been known for years, but only recently has abundant new documentation and interviews with participants made it possible for me to carry out a thorough investigation of Condor's underground operations. The complete results of my investigation is contained in my book, The Condor Years. Some of the new revelations of importance to the judicial process are provided here.
In October 1998, when Judge Baltasar Garzon petitioned for the extradition of General Pinochet from London to face trial in Spain, he chose a Condor crime to justify the request: the capture of MIR leader Edgardo Enriquez in Argentina in April 1976 and his subsequent secret transfer across border into Chile. Within weeks, courts in Rome and Paris opened judicial investigations centered around other Condor cases involving the capture of Uruguayans and Chileans in Argentina. As those cases advanced in recent years, an even more elaborate Condor case was launched in Argentina. Investigating judge Rudolfo Canicoba chose the cases of 72 victims --Chileans, Argentines, Bolivians, Paraguayans and Uruguayans-- who were captured by security forces outside of their own countries. His prosecution names as defendants a long list of top military personalities, including Pinochet, Argentina's Jorge Videla, Paraguay's Alfredo Stroessner, and Bolivia's dictator Hugo Banzer (since deceased). Extradition requests for all of these cases have ensured that these leaders and more than 200 other military officers named as defendants or material witnesses are unable to travel outside their own countries for fear of arrest by Interpol-- another irony since Operation Condor was explicitly designed to mimic (with illegal methods) the international cooperation of police forces in Interpol.
Finally, in 2002 Judge Juan Guzman Tapia began his investigation "2182-98 Operation Condor," the case that led last week to the stripping of Pinochet's immunity. That case also centers on the capture and killing of Edgardo Enriquez and on a series of Condor detentions in Argentina and Chile that is perhaps Condor's most complex operation, leading to the disappearance of 16 people and the extortion of tens of thousands of dollars.
One thing is undeniable about Operation Condor: in terms of its stated goal to eliminate the enemies of the military government it was a success. Among the most famous such operations were the assassination of General Carlos Prats, the former commander in chief of the Armed Forces and Pinochet's predecessor and rival, and the shooting of former Chilean vice president Bernardo Leighton in Rome. Condor as a formal six-country alliance was established in 1975 at the inspiration of Chile with the Prats and Leighton attacks as the new organization's model for the international pursuit of enemies.
Less well known are Condor's successful operations against the underground revolutionary alliance, the Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria (JCR), led by MIR chief Edgardo Enriquez from Argentina, and against the financial network of the Chilean Communist Party, the two operations that are at the center of Judge Guzman's investigation (and form part of the Spanish, French and Argentine investigations as well.)
Edgardo Enriquez, brother of MIR founder Miguel Enriquez and his successor as head of MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), had secretly set up his base of operations in Buenos Aires in May 1975. The arrest in Paraguay that same month of MIR operative Jorge Fuentes and an Argentine comrade was the beginning of the formal cooperation of security forces of Chile, Paraguay and Argentina. The Paraguay arrests provided information leading to a series of operations in Argentina in which MIR's most important leaders were picked off one by one, culminating in Enriquez capture and in April 1976, as he left a safe house in Buenos Aires.
According to my investigation and evidence in the hands of Judge Guzman, Operation Condor as a military alliance grew out of this coordinated effort to track down the MIR operatives and their allies in other revolutionary organizations. Condor was formally established at a meeting of intelligence officers in Santiago in late November 1975 and was made up of Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay and somewhat later Brazil.
One of the military officers interviewed by Judge Guzman acknowledged, in a deposition obtained by the author, that he delivered the invitations personally to security chiefs in all of these countries and --in evidence revealed here for the first time-- he suggested that General Pinochet may have had a direct role in the Condor meeting. The officer, Coronel de Aviacion Mario Jahn Barrera, who served at the time as director of international operations of DINA, said he attended the opening session (inauguracion) of the five-day meeting: "It is possible that it [the intelligence meeting] was presided over by General Pinochet or by one of the members of the junta, given the importance that they wanted to confer on this conference," Jahn said in a deposition to Judge Guzman.
The detention of Enriquez was the ultimate blow to the already staggering MIR and the JCR alliance. It was followed by other major Condor blows to the enemies of the military governments. In the months from May to October 1976 the coordinated security operations intensified, and were expanded to include Uruguayan and Bolivian officers. The successes were impressive: The list of international leaders captured and killed included: Enriquez's second in command Patricio Biedma; two young security officers from the Cuban Embassy in Argentina; the former president of Bolivia General Juan Jose Torres; the maximum leader of Argentina's ERP Mario Roberto Santucho; and a top leader of Uruguay's Tupamaros William Whitelaw. All were associated directly or indirectly with the international alliance of guerrilla organizations, the Junta de Coordinacion Revolutionaria. The JCR had set up its base in Argentina shortly after the coup in Chile in September 1973. Well financed with millions of dollars from kidnappings in Argentina, the JCR had arms factories and a network of militants in preparation for a planned multi-country counter-offensive against the dictatorships. After the 1976 Condor roundup, the JCR withdrew its operations from Argentina and was never again an effective threat against the military governments.
JCR prisoners --Bolivians (some of them brought from Bolivia), Paraguayans, Chileans, Uruguayans and the Cubans--were held in a building that had previously served as a car repair shop, known as Automotores Orletti, in the Floresta neighborhood in Buenos Aires. Orletti was the secret detention center dedicated to Condor activity. There the international prisoners were tortured and interrogated by officers from their own countries. Then they were loaded into trucks and executed. Some of the bodies (including those of the two Cubans) were eventually found in the harbor in barrels partially filled with cement. Dozens of Uruguayans from another revolutionary group, Partido Para la Victoria, were also rounded up and interrogated at Orletti.
The Condor operations targeted non-violent political enemies as intensely as they did the JCR and the other revolutionaries. In the same period, an Argentine-Uruguayan joint operation kidnapped two prominent Uruguayan political leaders, Zelmar Michelini and Hector Gutierrez, and dumped a car with their bullet riddled bodies under a bridge. And in Washington, DC, a group of anti-Castro Cuban terrorists, led by officers of Chile's DINA, planted and detonated a car bomb on a main avenue killing former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier.
In November 1976, a commando of 15 Chilean, Argentine and Uruguayan operatives were dispatched to Europe in another complex Condor mission to kill JCR leader Rene "Gato" Valenzuela in Paris. According to CIA documents obtained by the author, the mission also targeted for assassination the infamous Venezuelan terrorist Carlos the Jackal (aka Ilich Ramirez Sanchez), who had been a Condor objective since his name was discovered in a JCR member's address book in May 1975.
The European operation was discovered by the CIA and French intelligence services and the leak "blew" the mission. French intelligence confronted the Chilean, Uruguayan and Argentine security services involved in the operation, telling them they know about the assassination plans, resulting in the cancellation of the Condor mission, according to U.S. declassified documents. This was another tragic irony: The U.S. CIA had discovered Condor and its plans to assassinate opposition leaders more than two months before the Letelier assassination, but failed to deliver messages of warning to those same countries. In that case, the Condor mission went forward and resulted in its most spectacular assassination, of Letelier, in the United States capital. The Letelier assassination in Washington, proven by both US and Chilean courts to have been authored by Chile's DINA, is the only known case of a terrorist act inside the United States committed by an allied government, Chile, which at the time was one of the United States closest friends in Latin America.
Another less famous Condor Operation is being investigated by Judge Guzman. It is perhaps the most elaborate and complex of all the Condor missions, involving the roundup and disappearances of 16 people in two countries, the extortion and confiscation of tens of thousands of dollars, and an elaborate three-country coverup scheme. A Chilean communist with a Swiss passport, Alexei Jaccard Siegler, was transporting a suitcase of cash from Europe for delivery to party contacts in Santiago. He landed in Buenos Aires on May 16, 1977, and was picked up in the street the next day. Argentine agents immediately rounded up 12 Argentine communists and two other Chileans linked to Jaccard. At the time neither the Chilean nor the Argentine Communist Party were following a strategy of armed resistance against the military governments in their countries.
In Santiago, DINA agents kidnapped two Communist Party operatives thought to be the intended recipients of the money Jaccard was carrying. Within a few days of these arrests, two other Chileans, wealthy currency trader Jacobo Stulman and his wife Matilde, were taken into custody as they arrived from Santiago to Buenos Aires Ezeiza airport. All seven Chileans and nine of the Argentines picked up were never seen again and are listed as disappeared.
The Swiss government and U.S. Jewish organizations made aggressive efforts to investigate the disappearances. To cover their tracks, the intelligence agents faked the departure of Jaccard and the Stulman couple from Argentina, using airline manifests, forged hotel registrations and falsified immigration documents. The false documents showed Jaccard traveling to Chile a few days after his arrest, and then departing Santiago to Uruguay. False records also purported to show the Stulman couple’s arrival in Montevideo. In the vain hope of rescuing the couple, family members paid tens of thousands of dollars in ransom to unknown persons. In this case, too, there is an irony: The Stulman's relatives paid the man who is currently representing Augusto Pinochet as defense lawyer, Ambrosio Rodriquez, to travel to Argentina to try to find out what happened to the couple. Rodriquez, then as now, had astounding access to the inner circles of the dictatorships of the two countries. In Santiago, he met with Col. Manuel Contreras, head of DINA. In Buenos Aires, he received information about the Stulmans from the First Army Corps, the unit controlling the Argentine capital, whose Intelligence Battalion 601 was Chile's operational partner in Operation Condor.
Then he met with Enrique Arancibia Clavel, whom I identify in The Condor Years, as DINA's most clandestine intelligence operative in Buenos Aires and DINA's liaison to its Condor partner agency, the Batallon 601. In a remarkable report from Arancibia to his DINA superiors, dated July 17, 1977, Arancibia writes: "On July 8, 1977, I was contacted by Ambrosio Rodriguez, who told me it had become dangerous for him to stay in Buenos Aires because he was making inquiries about a married couple of Jewish origen, Stulman. Apparently Rodriguez has been in touch with the top chiefs of the Argentine Army in the area of security, who told him indirectly that this couple 'doesn't exist anymore.' … The official report of the Argentine First Army Corps is that they (the Stulman couple) have been handed over to DINA officials."
Although Rodriquez was extremely well paid by the family, the fate of the Stulmans and their money was never known. Rodriquez thus has been put in the position of being both a material witness, with potentially critical testimony about the Stulman kidnapping, and at the same time the defense lawyer for the chief defendant in the case, Pinochet. So far, according to sources, he has not cooperated in Judge Guzman's investigation.
This final example of a successful Condor operation against the financial network supporting the Communist Party in Chile also demonstrates in graphic detail the robust trail of evidence left behind by Condor's international activities. This abundance of evidence is one of the reasons that investigations of Condor have been so important in the international and national efforts to bring dictators to justice. Evidence in all the cases described here, and in many other Condor operations, is available in collections of previously secret documents discovered or declassified in the United States, Paraguay, Argentina and other countries. When Chile returned to democracy in 1990, Pinochet's officers were extraordinarily thorough in destroying incriminating documents in Chile (only a very few documents mentioning Condor, kept at the Ministerio de RREE, survived the limpieza). But in the allied Condor countries it was another story.
Dozens of documents describing Condor's characteristics and telexes proving the coordinated multi-country tracking down of enemies have been found in Paraguay and are kept in the so-called Archive of Terror under the auspices of the Supreme Court. Argentina's military purged most of the operational files that would have proved its responsibility for the mass murders, but they were sloppy about cleaning up after their ally, Chile. An Argentina court preserved several thousand pages of secret communications between Condor's man in Buenos Aires, Enrique Arancibia Clavel, and his bosses at DINA in Santiago.
Those unique documents (first discovered in Argentine federal court archives by Siete Mas 7 editor Monica Gonzalez) provide a road map of Condor's development and many of its most important operations, especially when examined together with other sources.
In addition, as an international intelligence operation, Condor attracted the special attention of the CIA and the FBI. Their reports, now declassified, were safe from the efforts by Pinochet and his allies to hide the evidence of their international operations. Taken together, the evidence of Condor is monumental and undeniable.
The evidence of Pinochet's own direct participation is also strong in the case of Condor. First, the establishment of an international military alliance involving six Latin American countries could only have been allowed if it had the explicit approval of the head of state, Pinochet. Lower level operations could perhaps be explained as "isolated abuses" or as Pinochet asserted in his interview with the Miami television station, as the actions of "people [who] can't control themselves." But such an excuse cannot be applied to an international alliance approved at a high level meeting in Santiago, financed by Chile, and --according to Col. Jahn--perhaps with Pinochet's personal presence.
Other evidence uncovered in my investigation points to Pinochet's involvement in the creation of Condor. According to a document dated September 15, 1975, smuggled into the hands of opposition leader Hugo Miranda in 1977, Contreras purportedly informed Pinochet of his plans to expand DINA into international operations and asked for funds --$600,000, an enormous sum at that time. Although the authenticity and origin of that document has never been confirmed, I received a report from a confidential source describing a meeting around the same time inside Diego Portales government headquarters that corroborates the request for funds and Pinochet's involvement: According to the source, who was present, Col. Mario Jahn met with Pinochet to seek funds for the "internationalization" of DINA.
Jahn was the man Contreras had put in charge of the project, the source said. “He was Conteras’s hombre de la internacionalización,” the source said. “He was having a meeting [with Pinochet] in one of the presidential dining rooms. He was saying, ‘This is the moment to move, to advance and bring the struggle to the world level.’ He was asking for money. He said the Americans were helping through Brazil.”
(Investigative material for this article is from my book, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and his Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (The New Press 2004), to be published in Spanish in December 2004 by Ediciones B.).
(Published June 4, 2004, in Siete Mas 7, Santiago, Chile)---

KISSINGER Y PERU

Pinochet Consults Kissinger about Invasion of Peru
Document from The Condor Years discloses secret meeting in which Pinochet discusses with Kissinger the possibility of Chile invading Peru. "Assume the worst, that is to say that Chile is the aggressor. ... What happens?" Pinochet asks Kissinger is a secret meeting June 6, 1976.
La conversación entre Pinochet y Kissinger, que tuvo lugar en Santiago en junio de 1976, forma parte del libro recientemente publicado en inglés por el periodista estadounidense John Dinges, titulado "La Operación Cóndor: Cómo Pinochet y sus aliados llevaron terrorismo a tres continentes".
EFEJune 4, 2004
LIMA--Pinochet quiso declarar la guerra a Perú en 1976, según revista limeña
La publicación cita una transcripción de un diálogo entre el ex dictador y el ex jefe de la diplomacia de EE.UU., Henry Kissinger, el cual fue desclasificado por Washington.
El ex dictador Augusto Pinochet comunicó en 1976 al entonces secretario de Estado de Estados Unidos, Henry Kissinger, su intención de declarar la guerra a Perú, según la transcripción de una conversación que publica este jueves la revista peruana Caretas.
El documento fue obtenido por el autor entre los papeles desclasificados por el Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos, según Caretas.
Según la transcripción de esta reunión celebrada en coincidencia con la Asamblea General de la Organización de Estados Americanos en 1976 en Santiago, Pinochet pregunta a Kissinger cómo tomaría Estados Unidos una guerra entre Perú y Chile.
Kissinger afirmó tener "un fuerte sentimiento de amistad hacia Chile", a lo que Pinochet contestó que su nación "ama la libertad" y que por esa razón "rechazó el comunismo cuando intentó tomar el país".
En la conversación, Pinochet dijo que "Perú se está armando" y está tratando de comprar "un portaaviones británico por 160 millones de dólares y cuatro torpederas en Europa".
"Perú está quebrando el equilibrio de armas en el Pacífico Sur, tiene 600 tanques de la Unión Soviética. Nosotros estamos haciendo lo que podemos para sostenernos en caso de una emergencia", agregó.
En ese entonces, el gobierno peruano hacía gestiones para adquirir el portaaviones británico HMS "Bulwak" como plataforma para operar aviones de despegue vertical Harrier, pero luego se desanimó al conocer el abultado presupuesto de tal compra.
Kissinger le dejó en claro a Pinochet que a Estados Unidos no le gustaría ver un conflicto entre los dos países, aclaró que dependía "de quién lo empiece" y que si los chilenos "toman Lima tendrán poco apoyo norteamericano".
"Si Perú atacara, sería un asunto muy serio para un país equipado con armamento soviético. Nos opondríamos diplomáticamente con claridad. Pero todo depende más allá de eso. En estos días no es fácil conseguir apoyo militar norteamericano", comentó Kissinger.
Pinochet, que gobernó entre 1973 y 1990, le pidió a Kissinger que "asuma lo peor", es decir, que "Chile sea el agresor". "Perú se defiende y después nos ataca. ¿Qué sucedería?", preguntó.
El premio Nobel de la Paz en 1973 y secretario de Estado con los presidentes Richard Nixon y Gerald Ford respondió, según la transcripción: "No es tan fácil (...). Los conflictos no resuelven las disputas internacionales".
Por más que "uno de los lados simule un incidente, nosotros sabríamos quién es el agresor", explicó el entonces alto funcionario de EE.UU., según recoge Caretas.
En la misma conversación, Pinochet consideró que "Perú se inclina más hacia Rusia que hacia EE.UU.". "Rusia apoya a su gente el 100 por ciento y nosotros estamos con ustedes", añadió.
Aunque Kissinger subrayó que EE.UU. no apoyaría una guerra contra Perú, dijo que "no permitirían" que un ejército de cinco mil cubanos apoyen el supuesto conflicto entre Chile y Perú.
"No le permitiremos a Cuba otra aventura militar. Una guerra entre Perú y Chile sería un asunto complejo, pero ante una entre Cuba, Chile y otros no seríamos indiferentes", explicó.
En la cita estuvieron presentes, además de Pinochet y Kissinger, el entonces ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Patricio Carvajal, el embajador chileno en Washington, Manuel Trucco, el secretario estadounidense a cargo de asuntos hemisféricos, William Rodgers, y dos personas no identificadas, según recoge Caretas. (EFE)

OPERACION CONDOR EN ESPAÑOL

Nuevo: Salió la traducción en español
Operación Cóndor: Una Década de Terrorismo Internacional en el Cono Sur(Ediciones B noviembre de 2004)Presentación en Santiago 7-12 de noviembre de 2004contacto: Maria Elena Ansieta o Andrea Palet, Ediciones B Chilemansieta@edicionesbchile.cl56 2 632 0581
"John Dinges lanza 'libro definitivo' sobre la alianza del terror'La Operación Cóndor prueba que la represión era una política de Estado'En medio del impacto del reconocimiento del jefe del Ejército, Juan Emilio Cheyre, de que en las violaciones a los DDHH en Chile hubo responsabilidad institucional de su fuerza, el periodista norteamericano lanza una investigación que confirma que el plan internacional comenzó en Santiago."Por Roberto Careaga CatenacciEl Mostrador, Chile
*Las Revelaciones Más Impresionantes de Operación Cóndor
*Noticias de casos judiciales relacionados a Operación Cóndor en España, Italia, Francia, Argentina y Chile (Ingles y Español)
* Libros recomendados
Operación Cóndor: El Plan que volvió contra Pinochet y sus aliados, por John Dinges, Siete Mas 7, 4 de Junio, 2004.

John Dinges, Operación Cóndor: Una Década de Terrorismo Internacional en el Cono Sur (Ediciones B 2004).La edición en español fue presentado por el autor durante la 24ta Feria Internacional del Libro de Santiago, Chile, 7 de Noviembre, en la Estación Mapocho, con la asistencia de más de doscientas personas y las panelistas Mónica Gonzalez, editor general, revista Siete Más Siete, Nelson Caucoto, abogado de derechos humanos.
Distribucion en America Latina y España por Ediciones B. Traducciones a Frances y Portugues en curso.

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

JUDIOS ORTODOXOS

Judíos Ortodoxos condenan las atrocidades sionistas en Gaza.

Una llamada de angustia por nuestros hermanos en Gaza y en Palestina.
Este discurso fue proclamado en nombre de Neturei Karta Internacional a las afueras del consulado Israel en Nueva York.
Debido a las restricciones religiosas del Shabbat, este discurso fue preparado antes y leído por un no-judío. Los manifestantes judíos caminaron casi 2 horas para llegar a la manifestación.
Assalam Alaikum
Hay una cruel y vil mentira que persigue al pueblo judío por todo el mundo. Esta gran mentira consigue grandes logros debido a la complicidad de grandes medios de comunicación y a los planes educativos de hoy en día.
Esta mentira ha traído mucho sufrimiento de gente inocente por todo el mundo y será causa de una desenfrenada y grave tragedia en el futuro.
Esta mentira declara que las "atrocidades cometidas por el estado de Israel contra la población de Gaza y de Palestina , son la voluntad del pueblo judío.
Esta mentira declara que el judaísmo y el sionismo son idénticos. Nada más alejado de la verdad.
El judaísmo y el sionismo están totalmente opuestos y el uno es la antitesis del otro.
El judaísmo es la creencia en la revelación en el Monte Sinaí.
Es la creencia que el exilio es un castigo para los pecados judíos.
Es la enseñanza de que la Torah de Di-s Todopoderoso nos prohíbe tener nuestro propio estado, o rebelarnos contra cualquier nación.
El sionismo ha renegado durante más de 100 años la revelación en el Sinaí.
El sionismo cree que el exilio judío se puede terminar a través de la fuerza militar, conquistando y oprimiendo
El objetivo del sionismo es convertir una fe en un nacionalismo..
El sionismo ha estado usurpando las propiedades del pueblo palestino.
No han hecho caso de sus demandas, justas y objetivas, sino que han perseguido, torturado y matado.
La Torah judía y el mundo religioso judío ha sufrido por tanto sufrimiento que está totalmente opuesto a los valores del judaísmo.
Millares de eruditos y santos de la Torah han condenado al sionismo desde su inicio. Sabían que la buena relación entre judíos y musulmanes en Tierra Santa y en el mundo entero se vería afectada mientras el sionismo existiera.
El estado de Israel rechaza muchos valores religiosos judíos. Sus leyes inhumanas e incompasivas son totalmente opuestas a la Torah.
Los judíos religiosos de la Torah han estado siempre opuestos al sionismo.
Nuestra presencia aquí hoy es para demostrar que el sionismo no representa al pueblo judío religioso.
Nos encontramos tristes por la cantidad de sangre que se derrama día a día en Tierra Santa. La mayoría de estas muertes han sido palestinas. Nada de esto podría estar sucediendo si el sionismo no hubiera conquistado el mundo con sus crueles ideas.
Nosotros, los judíos religiosos, estamos llamados a vivir en paz y armonía con nuestros vecinos y por supuesto a ser leales y correctos ciudadanos allí donde residamos.
Nuestro mensaje hoy debe ser sabido por la mayoría del mundo. Con la ayuda de Di-s quizás podamos contribuir a salvar a la gente en Palestina y ha ayudar a limpiar la cruel mancha que esta dejando el sionismo en la zona..
Mucha gente que se encuentra con nosotros ahora, representantes de organizaciones por los derechos humanos, miembros de ongs, lideres por la paz, creen que la solución pasa por la creación de dos estados, uno palestino y otro israelí. Pero, los judíos religiosos, representamos la opinión de la Torah, y nuestra solución es aceptar el mandamiento de Di-s que es la de oponernos al sionismo y a su estado.Es fundamental que este mandamiento Divino sea conocido por el mundo. Es muy importante que sepáis que cuando el sionismo justifica sus actos en base a la Torah, no os lo creáis, pues no es Di-s quien desea que se actúe de esa forma.
¿Y que sucede con nuestros hermanos islámicos?
Os hemos de decir que condenamos claramente las atrocidades sionistas en Tierra Santa. Deseamos poder estar en paz y en respeto mutuo, pero sabemos que no será posible mientras que el estado de Israel exista. Por este motivo, deseamos la disolución pacifica del estado israelí.
Que seamos dignos de ver la redención y el tiempo en el que todos nos unamos juntos en armonía y paz.
Assalam Alaikum

PERU: PARO REGIONAL

Perú: Preparan paro regional en el sur
Por: Prensa Latina Fecha de publicación: 27/02/08

imprímelo

mándaselo atus panas
27 Feb 2008.- Las presiones sociales sobre el gobierno de Perú, presidido por Alan García, se intensifican hoy con la confirmación de un nuevo paro en la región de Cusco y el anuncio de una protesta similar en todo el sur, masivamente opositor.
El coordinador de la Asamblea Regional del Cusco, Efraín Yépez, dijo que la fecha de un paro general de 72 horas en esa zona será definida en los próximos días y la apoyan al menos 18 frentes sociales de diversas regiones.
La protesta de Cusco, expresada la semana pasada en un paro total de 48 horas, demanda la anulación de una ley que facilita la instalación de hoteles y restaurantes en las inmediaciones de sitios arqueológicos, y considera que esta medida pone en peligro el patrimonio histórico y cultural.
El gobierno alega que el Congreso modificó la norma para que cada gobierno regional decida sobre su aplicación, pero las organizaciones de Cusco, principal destino turístico del país, consideran que el peligro sigue en pie.
Yépez dijo que la fecha de la nueva huelga probablemente coincida con un paro que impulsan las organizaciones sociales de la región amazónica, contra un proyecto de ley para la venta de territorios selváticos a inversionistas privados.
Entretanto, el presidente del Frente Amplio Cívico de la también sureña región de Arequipa, Ramón Pachas, anunció que el sábado próximo se reunirán allí dirigentes de organizaciones similares de todo el sur.
Pachas indicó que la cita acordará realizar un gran “paro macrorregional” en todo el sur contra la ley que Cusco repudia y que, dijo, amenaza también al patrimonio cultural de Arequipa y otros territorios.
Previamente, los dirigentes sociales del sur –de población básicamente opositora, según las encuestas- participarán en un foro sobre la política privatizadora vigente desde la pasada década.
Entretanto, el gobierno acusó ante el Ministerio Público a Yépez y al dirigente sindical constructor Tito Lenes, por violación de una ley que prohíbe los cortes de vías y acciones contra los servicios públicos.
El Ministerio de Transportes acusó a los dirigentes como responsables de los bloqueos que caracterizaron el paro de la semana pasada y de un intento de tomar el aeropuerto cusqueño.
Entretanto, una delegación de dirigentes sociales de la región centro andina de Ayacucho llegó a Lima para exigir justicia por la muerte de dos campesinos de durante un paro nacional agrario, que la semana pasada terminó con un saldo de cuatro decesos.
Los dirigentes rechazan la versión oficial que exculpa a la policía y dicen tener testigos de que los dos labriegos fueron ultimados a sangre fría por ésta que, según instituciones de derechos humanos, reaccionó en forma excesiva contra bloqueos campesinos de carreteras.

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

PARAMILITARES COLOMBIANOS Y LOS EEUU

Colombian Paramilitaries and the United States:"Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web"
Documents Detail Narco-Paramilitary Connection to U.S.-Colombia Anti-Escobar Task Force
CIA Probed Whether U.S. Intelligence Was Passed to 'Los Pepes' Terror Group
Colombian Government Both Recipient and Target of U.S. Intelligence
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 243
Edited by Michael Evans
Posted - February 17, 2008
For more information contact:Michael Evans - 202/994-7029
mevans@gwu.edu

In the news
"Pacto con el diablo"Semana magazine (Colombia)February 16, 2008
Colombia Documentation Project Archive
July 1, 2007
The Truth About Triple-ADocument Implicates Current, Fomer Colombian Army Commanders in Terror Operation
March 29, 2007
Documents Implicate Colombian Government in Chiquita Terror ScandalCompany's Paramilitary Payoffs made throught Military's 'Convivir'
October 16, 2005
Paramilitaries as ProxiesDeclassified evidence on the Colombian army's anti-guerrilla "allies"
August 2, 2004
U.S. Listed Colombian President Uribe Among "Important Colombian Narco-Traffickers in 1991"Then-Senator "Dedicated to Collaboration with the Medellín Cartel at High Government Levels"
May 3, 2002
War in ColombiaGuerrillas, Drugs and Human Rights in U.S.-Colombia Policy, 1988-2002
April 23, 2001
Shootdown in PeruThe Secret U.S. Debate over Intelligence Sharing in Peru and Colombia



Washington, D.C., February 17, 2008 - U.S. espionage operations targeting top Colombian government officials in 1993 provided key evidence linking the U.S.-Colombia task force charged with tracking down fugitive drug lord Pablo Escobar to one of Colombia's most notorious paramilitary chiefs, according to a new collection of declassified documents published today by the National Security Archive. The affair sparked a special CIA investigation into whether U.S. intelligence was shared with Colombian terrorists and narcotraffickers every bit as dangerous as Escobar himself.
The new documents, released under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, are the most definitive declassified evidence to date linking the U.S. to a Colombian paramilitary group and are the subject of an
investigation published today in Colombia's Semana magazine.
The documents reveal that the U.S.-Colombia Medellin Task Force, known in Spanish as the Bloque de Búsqueda or 'Search Block,' was sharing intelligence information with Fidel Castaño, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes (Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar or 'People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar'), a clandestine terrorist organization that waged a bloody campaign against people and property associated with the reputed narcotics kingpin. One cable describes a key meeting from April 1993 where, according to sensitive US intelligence sources, Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gómez Padilla said "that he had directed a senior CNP intelligence officer to maintain contact with Fidel Castano, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes, for the purposes of intelligence collection."
The no-holds-barred search for Escobar began in July 1992 after his escape from a luxury prison where he had been confined since surrendering under a special plea agreement with Colombian authorities. U.S. anti-narcotics strategy in Colombia was intensely focused on Escobar, the legendary Medellín Cartel kingpin who for years had waged a violent campaign of bombings and assassinations against Colombian law enforcement. This gloves-off strategy forged alliances between Colombian intelligence agencies, rival drug traffickers and disaffected former Escobar associates like Castaño, the godfather of a new generation of narcotics-fueled paramilitary forces that still plagues Colombia today.
The new collection also sheds light on the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Colombia's conflict—both the close cooperation with Colombian security forces evident in the Task Force as well as the highly-sensitive U.S. intelligence operations that targeted the Colombian government itself. Key information about links between the Task Force and the Pepes was derived from U.S. intelligence sources that closely monitored meetings between the Colombian president and his top security officials.
Several of the documents included in this collection were released as the result of a
lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act brought by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), a Washington-based policy group. To support its request, IPS relied on information revealed in Mark Bowden's 2001 book, Killing Pablo, a work that drew heavily on classified sources and interviews with former U.S. and Colombian officials. Since then, the National Security Archive has been working to assemble a definitive collection of declassified documents on the Pepes episode, precisely because the documents cited by Bowden have yet to see the light of day.
"The collaboration between paramilitaries and government security forces evident in the Pepes episode is a direct precursor of today's 'para-political' scandal," said Michael Evans, director of the National Security Archive's Colombia Documentation Project. "The Pepes affair is the archetype for the pattern of collaboration between drug cartels, paramilitary warlords and Colombian security forces that developed over the next decade into one of the most dangerous threats to Colombian security and U.S. anti-narcotics programs. Evidence still concealed within secret U.S. intelligence files forms a critical part of that hidden history."
"Sensitive PALO Reporting"
The documents include two heavily-censored CIA memos (Documents
25 and 28) describing briefings provided by members of a "Blue Ribbon Panel" of CIA investigators to members of U.S. congressional intelligence committees and the National Security Council. The Panel—which included personnel from the CIA's directorate for clandestine intelligence operations—had been investigating the possibility that intelligence shared with the Medellín Task Force in 1993 ended up in the hands of Colombian paramilitaries and narcotraffickers from the Pepes. That investigation concluded on December 3, 1993, the day Escobar was killed.
The CIA Panel aimed to compile a complete inventory of all U.S. intelligence information shared with the Task Force that may have been passed to the Pepes. And while the group's conclusions were not declassified, the briefing led one congressional staffer to comment that it was "one of the most bizarre stories" that he had ever heard, and to question why the CIA had been chosen to look into the matter rather than "some outside element." Why, in other words, would the CIA be put in charge of an investigation that so directly implicated the Agency itself?
For months, U.S. intelligence had been reporting about Task Force links with the Pepes:
The Embassy suspected some level of cooperation between Los Pepes and the Task Force as early as February 1993, when it reported that the Pepes attacks could be the work of "rogue policemen taking advantage of the rash of bombings to give Escobar a taste of his own medicine." (
Document 8)
A secret CIA report from March 1993 found that, "Unofficial paramilitary groups with a variety of backgrounds and motives are assisting Bogota's efforts against both the Medellin druglord Pablo Escobar and radical leftist insurgents. (
Document 10)
Around the same time, the CIA reported that the Colombian defense minister, Rafael Pardo, was "concerned that the police are providing intelligence to Los Pepes." In a document titled, "Colombia: Extralegal Steps Against Escobar Possible," Agency analysts predicted that President Gaviria's "demand for an intensified effort to capture Escobar may lead some subordinates to rely more heavily on Los Pepes and on extralegal means." [Emphasis added] (
Document 15)
By far the most detailed declassified record on the Pepes affair, the August 1993 Embassy cable,
"Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web," reveals that the Colombian government was both the recipient of U.S. intelligence information and the target of U.S. intelligence operations. Just as technical and investigative intelligence techniques tracked Escobar's movements and communications, other agents eavesdropped on the Colombian president's inner circle.
The most important information in the cable is attributed to "PALO" sources, an acronym that likely refers to the CIA. One indication of this is the fact that the cable—which includes the sensitive "NODIS" designation, limiting its distribution to a highly-select group of addressees—was referred to CIA before declassification.
According to the cable, Colombian prosecutor Gustavo DeGreiff had "new, 'very good' evidence linking key members of the police task force in Medellin charged with capturing Pablo Escobar Gaviria (the "Bloque de Busqueda") to criminal activities and human rights abuses committed by Los Pepes."
The cable describes a series of meetings from the previous April, including one where, according to "PALO" intelligence sources, Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gómez Padilla said "that he had directed a senior CNP intelligence officer to maintain contact with Fidel Castano, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes, for the purposes of intelligence collection."
A few days later, "PALO" reported that Colombian President César Gaviria ordered intelligence cooperation with Los Pepes to cease and told police intelligence commander General Luis Enrique Montenegro Rinco, "to 'pass the word' that Los Pepes must be dissolved immediately." Montenegro, according to the source, "was not a member of Los Pepes, but as commander of police intelligence knew some of the members, and was aware of their activities."
The very fact that Gaviria chose to deliver his message to Los Pepes through one of his senior police commanders was also significant, according to the Embassy, as an indication that "the president believed police officials were in contact with Los Pepes."
"Fidel Castano, Super Drug-Thug"
Besides the possible transfer of U.S. intelligence to the Pepes, a big concern among U.S. officials was the possibility that information connecting the Pepes to the Task Force—or an official investigation into the matter—would undermine the anti-Escobar effort and could provide significant leverage to the Cali Cartel in surrender negotiations with the Colombian government.
The Embassy reported in the
"Tangled Web" cable that President Gaviria "must deal with the issue in such a way as to remove the offenders, but at the same time, not discredit the police efforts against Escobar." (Document 20)
If Cali has concrete information of Bloque misdeeds that could embarrass the [Government of Colombia], it could be a powerful tool as they pursue surrender negotiations… The implication of key police officials and perhaps other high-level [Colombian government] officials in these activities, or the fact that high-level officers may be operating in the pay of the Cali cartel, could dramatically improve Cali's position.
An Embassy post-mortem cable on the Escobar affair, written less than a month after his death, similarly reported that "any substantiation of Cali-police complicity in the activities of Los Pepes would have seriously damaged the Bloque's credibility in their efforts against Escobar." (
Document 30)
More importantly, U.S. military intelligence doubted that the Gaviria government was sincere about cracking down on Castaño's gang, questioning whether it made sense to target a group that shared a common enemy: leftist Colombian guerrilla groups. One briefing document prepared by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in the midst of the Pepes episode concluded that the Colombian government's willingness to pursue Pepes military chief Castaño "may depend more on how his paramilitary agenda complements Bogota's counterinsurgent objectives rather than on his drug trafficking activities." (
Document 16)
By May 1994, only five months after the Task Force was dissolved, the State Department's intelligence branch was calling Fidel Castaño a "super drug-thug" and "one of Colombia's most ruthless criminals" who "could become a new Escobar." Castaño, the report read, "is more ferocious than Escobar, has more military capability, and can count on fellow antiguerrillas in the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police." It was, State reported, "unlikely that police or military officials would be willing to vigorously search for him if he did, in fact, act as an intermediary to deliver Cali bribes to senior police and military officers." (
Document 32)
The warnings proved to be deadly accurate. While Fidel disappeared in the mid-1990s and is presumed dead, his brother, Carlos Castaño, took over after Fidel's disappearance, uniting and strengthening Colombia's paramilitary armies under the banner of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a ruthless killing machine that vied with guerrilla groups for control of the country's lurcrative drug trade and which for many years met with little to no resistance from government security forces. A third Castaño brother, Vicente, allegedly murdered his brother Carlos and is said to be leading a new generation of Colombian narco-paramilitary groups.
Concerns that former Pepes would use their knowledge of official corruption to extract concessions from the Colombian government in surrender agreements resontate in the ongoing negotations with demobilized paramilitary leaders under the Justice and Peace law. Unlike the Cali traffickers--many of whom actually were taken down by authorities in the years that followed--Castaño and many of the other paramilitary thugs from Los Pepes largely escaped justice and have gone on to become major drug trafficking and paramilitary bosses in their own right. Former Pepe Diego Fernando "Don Berna" Murillo is currently in custody and seeking a reduced sentence under the law.Hidden History
Unfortunately, the vast majority of U.S. diplomatic and intelligence reporting on Los Pepes remains classified. A more complete declassified account of the matter—including the conclusions of the CIA investigation—would be of tremendous value both to historians and to ongoing peace and reconciliation efforts in Colombia. Among other things, the release of this material would support the Colombian government's National Commission on Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR) in the production of its report on the emergence and evolution of Colombia's illegal armed groups.
At issue is the exact nature of the relationship between the U.S.-Colombia Task Force and narco-terrorists led by Fidel Castaño, perhaps the most important single figure in the birth of Colombia's modern paramilitary movement. While it is certain that the Task Force was exchanging information with Castaño and Los Pepes, we do not know how long the Task Force maintained these ties and whether the relationship was sanctioned—either tacitly or explicitly—by U.S. participants in the Task Force, the Embassy, or at a more senior level of the U.S. government.
And while we know about the CIA's investigation, its conclusions are far from clear. Nor is it at all certain that the "Blue Ribbon Panel," which issued its findings only days after Escobar was killed, was the final word on the matter. Until the CIA is forced to open its files on the Pepes, we may never fully understand one of the key periods in the history of Colombian paramilitarism.

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U.S. Intelligence and Colombian Narcotics Cartels
Document 11992 July 29ARA Guidances, Wednesday, July 29, 1992 [Colombia: Chasing Escobar]Department of State cable, Unclassified, 4 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
Department of State press guidance prepared just after Escobar's escape from confinement indicates that Colombia has the "full support" of the U.S. in the search for Escobar.
Document 21992 July 31Council of State Plans Hearings on Overflights, Gaviria RespondsU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 5 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
Challenged over his decision permitting U.S. overflights of Colombian territory, Colombian President César Gaviria says that his order was constitutional and, according to this cable, "that the Colombian police authorities need the technical assistance of the [U.S. government] in order to find Pablo Escobar. Gaviria's explains that the U.S. C-130 aircraft "carry technical equipment, not armament" and are not "warplanes," and that his authorization of the overflights without informing the Council of State should thus not trigger any constitutional concerns.
Document 31992 August 10GoC to Begin Hitting Narcs on All FrontsU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 17 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
Shortly after Escobar's escape from confinement, Colombian Defense Minister Rafael Pardo assured Ambassador Busby that Colombia would "apply pressure on all the narco trafficking fronts" and that he had "ordered acting Armed Forces Commander General Manual Alberto Murillo Gonzalez to develop a plan that fully involved the Army, Navy and Air Force. The heavily-excised document adds that, "Pardo's enthusiasm and determination to go after the narcos using all of the above tactics fits squarely with our counternarcotics interests in Colombia. We need to be as responsive as possible to the [Colombian government's] requests for assistance."
Document 41992 August 11Monthly Status Report – July 1992U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 16 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
A brief Embassy post-mortem on Escobar's escape during an operation to move him to a conventional prison, calls the affair "an example of the correct strategic decision (to shut Escobar down) executed with unbelievable incompetence," concluding that corruption was "the determining factor." The cable reports that the Colombian government "has launched a full-court press to capture Escobar" and that the Embassy was "now looking at longer-range tactics." Well-publicized U.S. intelligence overflights of Colombia "may have spooked" Escobar, according to the report.
Document 51992 September 28Results of General Joulwan Visit to ColombiaU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 16 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
Following the visit to Colombia by General George Joulwan, commander-in-chief of U.S. Southern Command, the Embassy reports that he met with Embassy staff for a discussion focused on "the US/Colombian effort to capture Escobar." Much of the remainder of this heavily-censored cable concerns the importance of strengthening both U.S.-Colombia intelligence cooperation and military-police coordination in Colombia.
Document 61992 December 04Colombians to Continue the Fight Through the HolidaysU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 4 pp.Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA
Colombian government contacts have assured U.S. Embassy staff "that no operational unit commanders are being granted holiday leave" and that, "Police continue planning operations involving interdiction, fumigation, hunt for Pablo Escobar, and visits by senior officers to field operating units."
Document 71993 March 29Beyond Support Justice IV (SJIV)U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 12 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
As the hunt for Escobar continues, Embassy reporting reflects its recommendation that the U.S. widen the scope of the counternarcotics effort in Colombia "to include the full array of military support" and going "far beyond" previous levels of assistance. The Embassy contrasts "increasingly successful" intelligence and operational cooperation under the "Support Justice" program with other bilateral policy issues where there is more friction (like trade). Among many other issues, the Embassy lauds the "great strides in tactical capability (which we provided) made in the search for Pablo Escobar."
Los Pepes
Document 81993 February 01Escobar Family Target of Medellin Bombings U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 3 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
The Embassy speculates that recent attacks directed against Escobar family members are "almost certainly related, [and] perhaps carried out by[,] members of the Galeano-Moncada organization retaliating for Escobar's murder of the two former colleagues." Another possibility is that the attacks were the work of "rogue policemen taking advantage of the rash of bombings to give Escobar a taste of his own medicine."
Document 91993 February 24[Operation Envigado / Pablo Escobar-Gaviria] U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Limited Official Use, 6 pp.Source: DEA declassification release under FOIA
The DEA reports on the emergence of a new anti-Escobar group called Colombia Libre (Free Colombia) whose alleged purpose is "to employ and pay informants for information in connection with the whereabouts of Escobar and his cohorts." The group claims to be non-violent and is said to "cooperate fully with government officials." The report adds that "the Colombia Libre group does not command a great deal of credibility at this time."
Document 101993 March"Alliances of Military Convenience," from Latin American Military Issues, Number 3U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Secret, extract, 2pp.Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA
A classified CIA periodical on Latin American military issues reports that, "Unofficial paramilitary groups with a variety of backgrounds and motives are assisting Bogota's efforts against both the Medellin druglord Pablo Escobar and radical leftist insurgents."
Document 111993 April 06Monthly Status Report – March 1993 U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 7 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
This Embassy "summary of significant events" for March 1993 reports that the ebb in terrorist attacks attributed to Escobar's organization "could be attributed to a combination of the unrelenting pressure exerted by the Colombian security forces and the Pepes (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) against Escobar and his associates." So far in March, "four top lieutenants of Pablo Escobar were killed—two by Colombian security forces and two by the Pepes," according to the Embassy.
Document 121993 April 06GoC Denies Negotiations in Response to PepesU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
In response to allegations advanced by Los Pepes,Colombian officials deny that the government is negotiating the surrender of Pablo Escobar, adding that they "energetically reject any criminal form of fighting crime, as well as all types of private justice which attempt to assume responsibilities which correspond constitutionally to law enforcement authorities and the judiciary."
Document 131993 April 15GoC Foreign Policy Advisor on Latest Development in the Search for EscobarU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
In the midst of a series of high-level Colombian government meetings concerning ties between the Medellín Task Force and Los Pepes (see Document 20), the Embassy reports that President Gaviria's foreign policy advisor, Gabriel Silva, had said in an April 13 meeting "that it was not entirely coincidental that publicity regarding the search for Pablo Escobar had cooled off somewhat in the past few weeks." Silva told Ambassador Busby "that the GoC had become concerned about the expectations which had been built up concerning the Pablo Escobar Task Force (Bloque de Busqueda) in Medellin in the minds of the public" and that "expectations were running away from reality."
Interestingly, a subsequent reference to this same meeting from the "Tangled Web" cable (Document 20) reports that Busby had met with Silva that day "to express his strongest reservations" about Los Pepes, indicating that he suspected links between Colombian security forces and the terrorist group. These reservations are not mentioned in the April 15 account of the meeting.
Document 141993 April 26Los Pepes Declare Victory and Call it QuitsU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
Shortly after the mid-April meetings described above (and in greater detail in the "Tangled Web" cable), Los Pepes announced that the group's "military objective" against Escobar "has been completed in its majority" and that they would dissolve their organization in an effort to "assist the authorities, who in the end will be the ones to bring Pablo Escobar to justice." The letter further requests that "if military actions against Pablo Escobar and his organization continue in the name of the 'Pepes,' that they launch an exhaustive investigation to determine the real perpetrators."
Commenting, the Embassy says: "The entire Pepes episode has been bizarre at best," citing "rumors … of government involvement with the Pepes at the local police and military level." However, discussions with the Colombian government "lead us to believe it rejected the Pepes' tactics, were [sic] fearful of the implications of the appearance of yet another criminal organization, and were [sic] sincere in their offer of rewards to try to stop the organization."
The cable concludes with the Embassy's promise to "offer our own speculation and such information as we have in a separate cable."
Document 15Undated, Ca. April 1993Colombia: Extralegal Steps Against Escobar PossibleU.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Classification unknown, extract, 3pp.Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA
A heavily-censored CIA intelligence report finds that Colombian President César Gaviria "is worried that his political leverage and economic program will suffer unless Pablo Escobar is captured soon." Minster of Defense Rafael Pardo, meanwhile, "is concerned that the police are providing intelligence to Los Pepes, a violent paramilitary group of anti-Escobar traffickers." The report concludes that while there is "no evidence Gaviria would sanction police support for Los Pepes, his demand for an intensified effort to capture Escobar my lead some subordinates to rely more heavily on Los Pepes and on extralegal means."
Document 16Undated, Ca. April 1993Information Paper on "Los Pepes"U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Secret, 4 pp.Source: DIA declassification decision under FOIA
This DIA information paper prepared for the FBI provides general background information on Los Pepes, including its origins, composition and activities. The report finds that "Fidel Castano Gil," identified as "chief of operations" for the Pepes, could pose new and different challenges in a post-Escobar era," noting that "Castano's drug trafficking activities provide him the financing necessary to further an anti-left agenda." DIA concludes that the Colombian government's willingness to take on Castaño "may depend more on how his paramilitary agenda complements Bogota's counterinsurgent activities rather than on his drug trafficking activities."
Document 171993 May 07Text of Escobar's Latest Letter to the FiscalU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Limited Official Use, 5 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
The Embassy forwards the unreleased text of a letter from Pablo Escobar to the Colombian attorney general, Gustavo De Greiff. Escobar says that the Pepes have not disbanded and that "it is simply a stratagem" to "get the government to stop running its little television reward offer" for information on the Pepes. Escobar blames Fidel Castaño, the Cali cartel, and others for his problems and suggests that he could never get justice in Colombia's corrupt judicial system.
Document 181993 June 08Los Pepes Deny Involvement in Anti-Escobar TerrorismU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Classification unknown, 2 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
After the Pepes issued a communiqué denying responsibility for continuing attacks against Escobar associates, the Embassy comments that the Pepes likely are still involved in anti-Escobar terrorism "but publicly deny this in order to avoid [Colombian govnerment] persecution."
Document 191993 July 08Family Diaspora: Tracking Down the EscobarsU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 5 pp.Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA
By July 1993, the Medellín Task Force and Los Pepes had Escobar on the run, and his family had spread out across the globe, as reported in this cable. The Embassy speculates that one reason for this might be that, "Pablo and his brother Roberto are trying to protect family members from reprisals similar to those the anti-Escobar group 'Los Pepes' conducted" earlier in 1993.
Document 201993 August 06Unraveling the Pepes Tangled WebU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret/NODIS, 10 pp.Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA[NOTE: Portions of this document released on appeal appear with white letters on black background and can be difficult to read.]
By far the most detailed declassified record on the Pepes affair, this August 1993 Embassy cable reveals that the Colombian government was both the recipient of U.S. intelligence information and the target of U.S. intelligence operations. Just as technical and investigative intelligence techniques tracked Escobar's movements and communications, other agents eavesdropped on the Colombian president's inner circle.
The most important information in the cable is attributed to "PALO" sources, an acronym that probably refers to the CIA. One indication of this is the fact that the cable—which includes the sensitive "NODIS" designation, limiting its distribution to a highly-select group of addressees—was referred to CIA before declassification.
According to the cable, Colombian prosecutor Gustavo DeGreiff had "new, 'very good' evidence linking key members of the police task force in Medellin charged with capturing Pablo Escobar Gaviria (the "Bloque de Busqueda") to criminal activities and human rights abuses committed by Los Pepes."
The cable describes a series of meetings from the previous April, including one where, according to "PALO" intelligence sources, Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gómez Padilla said "that he had directed a senior CNP intelligence officer to maintain contact with Fidel Castano, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes, for the purposes of intelligence collection."
A few days later, "PALO" reported that Colombian President César Gaviria ordered intelligence cooperation with Los Pepes to cease and told police intelligence commander General Luis Enrique Montenegro Rinco, "to 'pass the word' that Los Pepes must be dissolved immediately." Montenegro, according to the source, "was not a member of Los Pepes, but as commander of police intelligence knew some of the members, and was aware of their activities."
The very fact that Gaviria chose to deliver his message to Los Pepes through one of his senior police commanders was also significant, according to the Embassy, as an indication that "the president believed police officials were in contact with Los Pepes."
The Embassy concludes that President Gaviria "must deal with the issue in such a way as to remove the offenders, but at the same time, not discredit the police efforts against Escobar." Incriminating information about the Task Force known by the Cali Cartel "could be a powerful tool as they pursue surrender negotiations," according to the cable, and "the implication of key police officials and perhaps other high-level [Colombian government] officials in these activities, or the fact that high-level officers may be operating in the pay of the Cali cartel, could dramatically improve Cali's position."
Document 211993 October 26The Hunt for Escobar: Next StepsU.S. State Department cable, Secret/NODIS, 2 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
In another highly-sensitve "NODIS" cable, the State Department, in a message meant exclusively for Ambassador Morris Busby or his deputy, requests a "detailed analysis" of certain U.S. support operations in Colombia connected to the "hunt for Pablo Escobar." The analysis is to focus on the contribution of each support element and also "put into perspective the evolution of our participation and the Colombian effort."
Noting with concern allegations of "human rights abuses" connected to the Escobar Task Force, the State Department also instructs the Embassy to press President Gaviria for the "immediate removal from duty" of a member of the Task Force "pending resolution of the investigation into the charges against him." The cable references the August 6, 1993, "Tangled Web" cable, indicating that the issues discussed in that message--including specific information tying the U.S.-Colombia Task Force and the Colombian National Police to the Pepes--was probably the source of the State Department's concern.
Document 221993 October 27The Hunt for Escobar: Next StepsU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret/NODIS, 2 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
Resonding to the State Department's cable of October 26 (Document 21), Ambassador Busby says that the so-called "debate" about the future of U.S. "hunt for Pablo Escobar" operations "frankly mystifies" the Embassy. Busby notes that a "complete review of our intelligence and operations traffic so far reveals nothing extraordinary" and that nothing had changed over the last two-and-a-half months "which would prompt such a 'debate.'" Busby adds that the Embassy "would very much appreciate the Department articulating to us the origin and substance of this debate."
Document 231993 December 06Colombian Law Enforcement Action Against Pablo EscobarU.S. Department of State cable, Unclassified, 1 p.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
Acting Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff sends a congratulatory cable to Ambassador Busby, commending his "success in coordinating the many U.S. government agencies which worked with the Colombian government for more than seventeen months to end Pablo Escobar's ability to evade Colombian law." Tarnoff wants to maintain momentum as they continue "efforts to strengthen Colombia's ability to arrest, prosecute and imprison cartel kingpins."
The Aftermath: Colombia After Escobar
Document 241993 NovemberThe Illicit Drug Situation in ColombiaU.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Drug Intelligence Report, Classification unknown, 67 pp.Source: DEA declassification release under FOIA
This is an unclassified DEA overview of the illegal narcotics industry in Colombia.
Document 251993 December 06Briefing of NSC and SSCI on "Los Pepes" AffairCentral Intelligence Agency memorandum for the record, Secret, 3 pp.Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA
In two separate briefings, members of the CIA's "Blue Ribbon Panel" on the Pepes matter—including officials from the Directorate of Operations and the chief of the CIA's independent investigations unit—brief the National Security Council and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staffers just days after Escobar is killed. Assembled in early November, the Panel was to look at whether U.S. intelligence information provided to the anti-Escobar Task Force was shared with members of the Pepes terror group, which was by then known to have connections to senior Colombian police officials leading the Task Force. The Panel told the NSC that the "Embassy Joint Task Force" on Escobar "maintained no record of information passed to the Colombians," but that another source, excised from the declassified memo on the briefing, "kept a log of all information passed to the Colombians," that the Panel was trying to obtain. The SSCI staff received a shorter briefing, asked no questions, and was not told about the existence of a separate log.
A separate memo reports the briefing given by the Panel to members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (see Document 28)
Document 261993 December 17President Gaviria Threatened by Escobar AssociatesU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 4 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
A 'Secret' cable from the Embassy reports that President Gaviria had received a letter from Escobar's group "The Extraditables" threatening to assassinate the president. Commenting, the Embassy says that "the threat from the Escobar organization is being interpreted as a retaliation against the government not only for the death of Escobar, but also for the favoritism the [Government of Colombia] is showing towards the Cali cartel."
Document 271993 December 20New National Police Chief AppointedU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA
Longtime Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gomez Padilla has resigned and will be replaced by General Octavio Vargas Silva, the man "who headed the successful anti-Escobar task force." A portion of the cable redacted upon first review but later released by the State Department's Appeals Review Panel says that Gomez "was especially disturbed over the influence of the Cali cartel in numerous levels of government" and that he "had simply had enough of the situation." The career of General Vargas, the Embassy adds, has been tainted by "press reports which attributed part of his success in hunting Escobar to assistance by Cali traffickers."
Document 281993 December 27Briefing for HPSCI Staff on Results of "Los Pepes" Panel and on Death of Pablo Escobar Central Intelligence Agency memorandum for the record, Secret, 6 pp.Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA
In a briefing similar to those reported in Document 25, the CIA's "Blue Ribbon Panel" on the Pepes affair met with staffers from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on December 6.
Attached to a memo about the meeting is a heavily-redacted copy of a paper on the "findings and conclusions" of the Panel. Also attached is a "background" paper on the Panel itself. The Panel "met full time from 8 November through 3 December 1993" and produced "daily 'fact sheets' for the [Executive Director] beginning on 15 November" as well as a "final Panel report" that "integrates these fact sheets."
After the briefing, HPSCI staffer Dick Giza called the issue "one of the most bizarre stories" he'd ever heard of, "both in how it arose and how it was investigated," asking why the investigation had not been assigned to an "outside element" like the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).
Document 291994 January 04Secret Witness Linked to Villa Alzate MissingU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 4 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
A news item on the disappearance of a former member of the anti-Escobar Task Force and secret paid witness of the attorney general's office catches the Embassy's attention. Ex-police agent Jaime Rincon Lezama ("Fernando") disappeared in May 1993 and had been allegedly providing prosecutors with "information on the identities and activities of Los Pepes within the Bloque [Task Force]." Rincon reportedly worked for the former delegate attorney general for judicial police affairs, Guillermo Villa Alzate, who has been linked to the Cali cartel and "whose exact whereabouts remain unclear." Despite Villa's ties to the cartel, the Embassy comments that "it would be premature to discount altogether unofficial police participation in his disappearance considering that Fernando supposedly fingered over 10 of his former colleagues as operatives of Los Pepes."
Document 301994 January 07Villa Alzate Speaks: Denies Any Connection with Disappearance of Secret WitnessU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 5 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
Former delegate attorney general for judicial police affairs and alleged Cali cartel conspirator Guillermo Villa Alzate reemerges to defend himself following accusations (detailed above) that he is connected to the disappearance of a former police official who had been providing him information on the Task Force's connections to Los Pepes. The Embassy notes that the development "once again raises questions as to the extent of possible Cali cartel influence," adding that "it is also clear that any substantiation of Cali-police complicity in the activities of Los Pepes would have seriously damaged the Bloque's credibility in their efforts against Escobar."
Document 311994 February 11Presidential Contender Samper and Ambassador Discuss Narcotics, Political, and Economic Issues U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 9 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
Amidst a discussion about the death of Pablo Escobar, Colombian presidential candidate and later president Ernesto Samper tells U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette that the Cali cartel "is worse" than Escobar "because its level of sophistication has permitted it to penetrate Colombian society at virtually all levels." However, Samper says that "the door should be kept open for those who wish to exercise the option to use legal procedures" to dismantle the Cali cartel. Ambassador Frechette doubts that the Cali capos would hold up their end of the bargain, observing that "the cartel's armed branch, the 'Pepes' was capable of assassinations and violent crime." Samper campaign finance director and ex-justice minister Monica DeGreiff replies that "her sources within the cartel had warned her that the deal would greatly reduce the possibility of violence from 'difficult to control cartel elements.'"
Document 321994 May 26Profile of Fidel Castano, Super Drug-ThugDepartment of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Assessment, Secret, 3 pp.Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA
This State Department intelligence profile of Fidel Castano says that the former Escobar strongman was "a principal leader of Los Pepes, which provided officials with information on the whereabouts of Escobar and attacked supporters and properties of Escobar." Castano "reportedly acted as an intermediary between the Cali cartel and the Escobar search force." The Pepes were "financially backed by the Cali cartel" and "reportedly had the tacit support of some senior Colombian police officials," according to the report. The report details the Castano family's long history of involvement in violent narcotrafficking and anti-guerrilla activities. According to the report, Castano is "more ferocious than Escobar, has more military capability, and can count on fellow antiguerrillas in the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police." The report says that Castano "hopes his work with Los Pepes will earn him judicial leniency," adding that "it is unlikely that police or military officials would be willing to vigorously search for him if he did, in fact, act as an intermediary to deliver Cali bribes to senior police and military officers."
Document 331994 June 30Delivery of Demarche to President GaviriaU.S. Department of State cable, Secret, 5 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
A toughly-worded diplomatic note to Colombian president-elect Ernesto Samper makes clear that the State Department expects results from the new administration, which has been tainted by a narcotics scandal. The State Department says that it is "deeply troubled by the information pointing to the influence of drug trafficking organizations" in Samper's presidential campaign," which create the impression "that drug traffickers have used intimidation and financial power to purchase influence in your administration." The State Department also reminds the Embassy that "our bilateral relationship will be predicated on Samper taking a tough counternarcotics stance."
Document 341994 September 07GoC Overhauls Police LeadershipU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 7 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
Colonel Hugo Martinez, commander of the "Search Bloc" that hunted down Pablo Escobar in 1993, is named director of the National Judicial Police (DIJIN) a special police intelligence organization. The Embassy notes that Martinez, "as head of the unit," was "responsible for directing the actions of the Bloque," which, according to the Colombian attorney general, had "a high incidence of human rights complaints" and about which there were "allegations that the Bloque (and Martinez) was closely tied with "Los Pepes" (a group committed to killing Pablo Escobar) because of their common goal."
Document 351997 January 17Police General Montenegro to Head DASU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
In January 1997, Colombian National Police commander General Rosso Jose Serrano named Gen. Luis Enrique Montenegro Rinco, the former police intelligence commander, as the new director of the Administrative Security Department (DAS – similar to U.S. FBI). As police intelligence chief, Montenegro had been a key informational link between the Medellín Task Force and Los Pepes.
Document 362003 October 03Medellin SnapshotU.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA
This 2003 'snapshot' of Medellín reports that unidentified individuals had told the Embassy that, "elements of the army" were supportive of paramilitaries from the Nutibara Block, "composed of former leaders of the ultra-violent 'Pepes' group that played a key role in bringing down drug kingpin Pablo Escobar."